# 1NC

## Security

#### War powers policy analysis is plagued with flawed scholarship based on constructed threats to US national security – these threats reify the power of the executive while resulting in endless warfare – questioning the underlying assumptions of the knowledge presented in the 1AC is critical to creating a base for substantive political change

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Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike – at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides – and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be – remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view – such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have – at times unwittingly – reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.” For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.” Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers – which have been consistent in recent years – place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger – requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization – such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions – like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home – shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’ 195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm – the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed, its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’ – marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact – than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the r elationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars – emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness – is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants – danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently – it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The p roblem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

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#### Constructs a cancer of pathological individuals that needs cutting out before they spread.

Egan 02(R. Danielle, Assistant Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language, ed. Collins and Glover, p. 23

This **panic blinds the population by warping their perceptions through fear**. Attorney General John **Ashcroft stated that terror­ist cells still exist and we need to root them out**; he further stated that terrorists “are poisoning our communities with Anthrax.” **The use of “terrorist cells” by the government invokes** another disease—**cancer. Like the metastatic rogue cell in the body, the terrorist cell is pathological and needs cutting out before its pathology spreads to the larger social body. This discourse per­petuates the perception that the spore/terrorists are everywhere, thereby justifying the rounding up of nine hundred and ninety “suspects” since 9/11. These roundups or sweeps are viewed as “necessary” in our fight against “evil.” Yet out of the nine hun­dred and ninety detainees only ten have any known connection with 9/11**, and a fifty-five-year old man detained by the Depart-merit of Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) has died “mysteriously” in prison. **This alone is sufficient for a cultural panic surrounding the erosion of our civil rights**; however, our Anthrax **panic creates a discourse that hides abuse of power and lack of due process, and, in effect, creates an ideology making these sweeps a necessary result of our internal war to protect the immune system of body America**. America will never be the same, they say; however, if we examine the history of U.S. foreign policy and FBI tactics domestically we see the ghost of violations past rearing its ugly head, similitude in its worst form.

Economic security discourse attempts to violently re-order the world

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), 2008 (“Critique of Security.” Pg. 101-102. )

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’. Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or economic well-being’, the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasize economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’. Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the glove. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere… It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them… to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about it part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital-accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere.

**Their representations of the savage terrorist and the “axis of evil” trying to acquire the bomb are reminiscent of the racist civilizational distinctions used throughout history to justify atrocity.**

**Sharp, ‘7** [2007, Patrick B. Sharp, Chair, Department of Liberal Studies California State University, Los Angeles, Ph. D. in English University of California, Santa Barbara, M.A. in English University of California, Santa Barbara, B.A. in English (High Honors) University of California, Santa Barbara, American Association of Colleges and Universities Institute on High-Impact Practices and Student Success, University of Vermont, University of Oklahoma Press : Norman, “Savage Perils: Racial Frontiers and Nuclear Apocalypse in American Culture” pdf]

On 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush gave the first post- 9/11 State of the Union address. The United States had invaded Afghanistan and struck at the bases of Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks. However, Bush saw a much bigger threat to “the civilized world”: he asserted that an “axis of evil” was “seeking weapons of mass destruction” and urged that the “war on terror” be expanded beyond the borders of Afghanistan.1 The “axis of evil” consisted of Iraq, Iran, North Korea “and their terrorist allies.”2 In the days, months, and years that followed, Bush committed the United States to a wide-ranging series of military operations under the banner of the “war on terror,” a war that eventually led to the controversial invasion and occupation of Iraq. At the heart of Bush’s rhetoric was a basic opposition, a “fight between civilization and terror” that threatened to undermine the “existence of free nations.”3 Time after time, Bush attempted to invoke fear in his audience by warning that technologically backward “terrorists” were close to getting their hands on advanced modern weapons, including that most feared weapon of all, the atomic bomb. Bush’s representation of terrorism bore a striking resemblance to the notion of savagery that once dominated American national discourse. By representing terrorists as the opposite of the “civilized world,” Bush tapped into a rich vein of racism that extended back to the dawn of the United States, when the idea of civilization was intimately connected to the idea of race. Beginning in the 1750s, these two ideas were developed by scientists and intellectuals in Europe and America who were attempting to account for the supposed cultural and biological inferiority of people who were not of European descent.4 The distinction between white civilization and nonwhite savagery became deeply entwined in American colonial discourse and served as a rallying point for white Americans as they pushed the frontier across the continent. By the 1850s, scientists in the United States had developed a theory of human difference known as polygenesis. This theory asserted that different races originated from separate creations and thus constituted separate species. Polygenesis was a product of a society deeply invested in the connection between white superiority and American national identity. The enslavement of African Americans, the war against Mexico, and the repeated atrocities against Native Americans were all justified in part by appealing to the belief in an ongoing racial war between civilization and savagery. If the polygenists were correct, then the nonwhite races were not fully human and did not have a claim to the rights spelled out in the founding documents of the United States. Long after the scientific ideas of the polygenists were rejected, their formulation of race still held currency in the United States. The reason was simple: polygenism was merely one expression of a deeply racist society that was built on the notion of civilized progress replacing savagery.

#### Descriptions of China are not neutral or objective – Their strategies are self-fulfilling prophecies that must be critically interrogated

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 305-307

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers**/**mainstream China **specialists** see themselves (as representativesof theindispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

#### The mindset of endless threats is a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to the constant creation of more threats

**Lipschutz 1998**

Ronnie, Director – Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, “On Security” p. 8

Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed  concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.[18](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note18#note18) It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.[19](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note19#note19) To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there."[20](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note20#note20) But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions.[21](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note21#note21) That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective.

#### Security discourse sanitizes global destruction by proliferating symptom-focused solutions to power imbalances—-causes cycles of violence that make global warfare and extinction inevitable—adopt the role of a critical intellectual to question the claims of the 1AC

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This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to ecological, energy and economic crises [critical security studies] in the context of the historically-speciﬁc socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises [historical sociology and historical materialism]. Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conﬂictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to addressthe relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox **IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence**. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87 By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nulliﬁed under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’them– and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conﬂict and militarisation responsible for magniﬁed global insecurity. ‘**Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’** – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, **all in the name of survival** itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response **to an existential danger**.89 The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system [geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on], phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conﬂicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafﬁcking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring **urgent transformation**, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed [given that state power itself is constituted by these structures] deserve protection. **This justiﬁes the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics**. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. 3.2 From theory to policy Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’. 95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, **this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer**. Instead, **by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity**. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conﬂict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conﬂict are ominous.’ 97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conﬂict.’ 98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conﬂict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’ 99 3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation? Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufﬁcient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. 101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of‘othering’in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a speciﬁc socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104 Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating various forms of violence. Conclusions While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conﬂict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies [which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures]. This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost – precisely because the efﬁcacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conﬂict per se. Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’ [in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms] necessitate conﬂict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to con- ﬂict. The ﬁrst is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global ﬁnancial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to [1] fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and [2] translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, **lacking capacity for epistemological self-reﬂection** and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse ‘Others’, newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously ampliﬁed by global crises – a process that guarantees the intensiﬁcation and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

## Drone Prolif

#### Drone policy is shrouded in secrecy – debate about targeted killing is impossible because of the lack of transparency – instead of assessing the information selectively leaked by the government, debate must center on the production of knowledge behind drone secrecy.

Toth, ’13 [Kate Toth, London School of Economics, Dissertation; “REMOTE-CONTROLLED WAR: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTANCING OF STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE ON AMERICAN DEMOCRACY”; Apr 27, 2013; http://www.academia.edu/3125323/REMOTE-CONTROLLED\_WAR\_IMPLICATIONS\_OF\_THE\_DISTANCING\_OF\_STATE-SPONSORED\_VIOLENCE\_ON\_AMERICAN\_DEMOCRACY]

With regard to drones, what the public knows has been released through leaks to the press that were likely approved by the President (Engelhardt, 2012). Though the government now claims the right to assassinate Americans along with foreigners through the drone program, “informed public debate and judicial oversight” are impossible because “its drone program is so secret [the government] can't even admit to its existence” (Freed Wessler, 2012). That is, except via leaks that allow Obama to craft a politically advantageous narrative (Friedersdorf, 2012a). Meanwhile, the use of drones has exploded domestically, and again, “citizens lack a basic right to know who is operating the drones circling their houses, what information is being collected and how it will be used” (ABC News, 2012). The Bush administration politicized science (Beck, 1992) by notoriously editing reports on climate change and pressuring scientists (Coglianese, 2009). This is instructive for the current debate as it exhibits that one cannot simply assess the information released, but examine this knowledge within a political context, harking back to Foucault’s (1997) production of knowledge. Writing about the covert drone strikes, Friedersdorf (2012b) in The Atlantic asked, “in what sense would we be living in a representative democracy if neither the bulk of Congress nor the people” are told about the strikes? One of the lingering questions raised from this debate is, how different is it if we were told the bare minimum of facts via leaks, so still preventing effective debate, versus being told nothing at all? When President Obama took office, in the memo outlining his “Transparency and Open Government” initiative, it was written that transparency will “ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” and that this transparency will “strengthen our democracy” (White House, 2009). This is what Obama believes transparency has the power to achieve, and it falls in line with the access to information that Diamond and Morlino (2004) highlight as key to accountability in democracy. President Obama’s track record is, perhaps, an example of not striking the right balance between what, and how much, to release. However, given that many of the steps he has taken, both in terms of transparency of existing programs and secrecy regarding proliferation of new programs such as drones, it does not seem likely that this is unintentional. Transparency relies on a strong civil society to use the information effectively, or press for it to be released (Etzioni, 2010); perhaps this lack of accountability is also indicative of the weakness of current American civil society and media.

#### No Asian war- China creates stability

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At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. Yet, months later, nothing has happened. And despite their aggressive posturing in the disputed territory, both sides now show glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability. Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, China cannot afford military conflict with any of its Asian neighbors. It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chinese officials see that even the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damage that such a use of force would cause to Beijing's two most fundamental national interests -- economic growth and preventing the escalation of radical nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep Xi Jinping, China's new leader, from authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, Beijing has promoted peace and stability in Asia to facilitate conditions amenable to China's economic development. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, although often seen as a promoter of conflict, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. Ever since the Tiananmen Square massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the coming months it will quietly seek a way to shelve the dispute in return for securing regional stability, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

## Terror

#### No risk of a bioterror attack, and there won’t be retaliation - your evidence is hype

Matishak ‘10 (Martin, Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Unlikely to Respond to Biological Threat With Nuclear Strike, Experts Say,”, <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100429_7133.php>, April 29, 2010)

WASHINGTON -- The United States is not likely to use nuclear force to respond to a biological weapons threat, even though the Obama administration left open that option in its recent update to the nation's nuclear weapons policy, experts say (See GSN, April 22). "The notion that we are in imminent danger of confronting a scenario in which hundreds of thousands of people are dying in the streets of New York as a consequence of a biological weapons attack is fanciful," said Michael Moodie, a consultant who served as assistant director for multilateral affairs in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the George H.W. Bush administration. Scenarios in which the United States suffers mass casualties as a result of such an event seem "to be taking the discussion out of the realm of reality and into one that is hypothetical and that has no meaning in the real world where this kind of exchange is just not going to happen," Moodie said this week in a telephone interview. "There are a lot of threat mongers who talk about devastating biological attacks that could kill tens of thousands, if not millions of Americans," according to Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But in fact, no country out there today has anything close to what the Soviet Union had in terms of mass-casualty biological warfare capability. Advances in biotechnology are unlikely to change that situation, at least for the foreseeable future." No terrorist group would be capable of pulling off a massive biological attack, nor would it be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation, he added. The biological threat provision was addressed in the Defense Department-led Nuclear Posture Review, a restructuring of U.S. nuclear strategy, forces and readiness. The Obama administration pledged in the review that the United States would not conduct nuclear strikes on non-nuclear states that are in compliance with global nonproliferation regimes. However, the 72-page document contains a caveat that would allow Washington to set aside that policy, dubbed "negative security assurance," if it appeared that biological weapons had been made dangerous enough to cause major harm to the United States. "Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat," the posture review report says. The caveat was included in the document because "in theory, biological weapons could kill millions of people," Gary Samore, senior White House coordinator for WMD counterterrorism and arms control, said last week after an event at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Asked if the White House had identified a particular technological threshold that could provoke a nuclear strike, Samore replied: "No, and if we did we obviously would not be willing to put it out because countries would say, 'Oh, we can go right up to this level and it won't change policy.'" "It's deliberately ambiguous," he told Global Security Newswire. The document's key qualifications have become a lightning rod for criticism by Republican lawmakers who argue they eliminate the country's previous policy of "calculated ambiguity," in which U.S. leaders left open the possibility of executing a nuclear strike in response to virtually any hostile action against the United States or its allies (see GSN, April 15). Yet experts say there are a number of reasons why the United States is not likely to use a nuclear weapon to eliminate a non-nuclear threat. It could prove difficult for U.S. leaders to come up with a list of appropriate targets to strike with a nuclear warhead following a biological or chemical event, former Defense Undersecretary for Policy Walter Slocombe said during a recent panel discussion at the Hudson Institute. "I don't think nuclear weapons are necessary to deter these kinds of attacks given U.S. dominance in conventional military force," according to Gregory Koblentz, deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University in Northern Virginia. "There's a bigger downside to the nuclear nonproliferation side of the ledger for threatening to use nuclear weapons in those circumstances than there is the benefit of actually deterring a chemical or biological attack," Koblentz said during a recent panel discussion at the James Martin Center. The nonproliferation benefits for restricting the role of strategic weapons to deterring nuclear attacks outweigh the "marginal" reduction in the country's ability to stem the use of biological weapons, he said. In addition, the United States has efforts in place to defend against chemical and biological attacks such as vaccines and other medical countermeasures, he argued. "We have ways to mitigate the consequences of these attacks," Koblentz told the audience. "There's no way to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapon." Regardless of the declaratory policy, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will always provide a "residual deterrent" against mass-casualty biological or chemical attacks, according to Tucker. "If a biological or chemical attack against the United States was of such a magnitude as to potentially warrant a nuclear response, no attacker could be confident that the U.S. -- in the heat of the moment -- would not retaliate with nuclear weapons, even if its declaratory policy is not to do so," he told GSN this week during a telephone interview. Political Benefits Experts are unsure what, if any, political benefit the country or President Barack Obama's sweeping nuclear nonproliferation agenda will gain from the posture review's biological weapons caveat. The report's reservation "was an unnecessary dilution of the strengthened negative security and a counterproductive elevation of biological weapons to the same strategic domain as nuclear weapons," Koblentz told GSN by e-mail this week. "The United States has nothing to gain by promoting the concept of the biological weapons as 'the poor man's atomic bomb,'" he added.

#### Economy instability doesn’t affect international security

Barnett ‘9 (Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### Drones have become the technological symbol of disorder – debate about targeted killing must avoid impossible questions of “drones good or bad” that echo the polarization of status quo political discourse – facts alone will never be enough – instead, we must learn from the complexities surrounding drones and apply them to the concerns of so many about personal security.

Rothenberg, ‘13 [Daniel Rothenberg is a professor of practice at the School of Politics and Global Studies, ASU and the Lincoln fellow for Ethics and International Human Rights Law. He is editing a book with Peter Bergen on drones to be published later this year. “What the Drone Debate Is Really About”; May 6, 2013; <http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/05/drones_in_the_united_states_what_the_debate_is_really_about.html>]

The term drone draws attention, elicits passions, and sparks heated discussions. Often the debate about drones flattens the complexity of real policy issues as the questions asked demand impossible answers, “Are drones good or bad?” or “Are you for or against drones?” Not surprisingly, this approach heightens the tensions attached to debate about drones, turning conversations into arguments and echoing the polarization that characterizes so much of contemporary political discourse. The intensity of interest in drones arose some years after they became a key element of U.S. military operations abroad. Interestingly, after more than a decade at war, drones remain the only military system within an extraordinarily advanced arsenal to have captivated popular attention. And they have done so at a time when the public has grown weary of war and the deep confusions surrounding the objectives, value, and purpose of these conflicts. For many within the military, the intensity of the debate about drones in combat has been perplexing. As they often point out, drones are simply one of a number of military platforms upon which information-gathering technology or weapons are deployed. For tactical purposes, it may make little difference whether a Hellfire missile is launched from a fighter jet or a drone. And, as military experts and knowledgeable observers emphasize, drones do not operate independently—rather, they are part of a complex, multilayered system in which particular technologies, drones and others, are useful only as integrated within a larger strategic vision. That said, much of the discussion of drones focuses not on their use by the military within defined war zones, where domestic and international law applies, but rather to their use by the CIA and other organizations in places where the legality of their deployment is under question, where data are minimal and where secrecy prevails. In this way, covert drone strikes are the latest in a series of interrelated issues—including torture, black sites, and extraordinary rendition—that reflect directly on the meaning, impact, and ethics of U.S. strategy (once called the global war on terror). Yet, even as drones are linked to existing questions of the appropriateness, legitimacy, and potential illegality of U.S. action, they are the only element of this critique linked to advanced technology, with its complex evocation of promise and danger. Drones have become the iconic public image of the U.S. government’s international projection of military force, during a complex and uncertain time when support is waning and there is great confusion as to the purpose of these ongoing conflicts. More recently, public debate on drones has turned to their current and potential use within our country. And, in this context as well, drones have produced tense discussions about multiple issues including protecting privacy, respecting core constitutional rights, and enabling potential abuses of state power. In response, there are demands for increased regulation as well as concerns that new rules will have a profoundly negative effect on our society. Many worry that the use of drones in our country will usher in a new era of intrusive state surveillance and may even be used as a means of attacking and killing American citizens here at home. For those who currently use drones or advocate for their expanded deployment—whether for military or civilian applications—these debates are deeply frustrating. They point out that drones are simply machines, neither good nor bad, not the sort of issue for which one should seek either support or rejection. They point to drones’ capacity to safely, effectively and inexpensively fight fires, monitor weather patterns, spray crops, and provide ongoing real-time information on hundreds of issues. This is why there is an ongoing effort to shift the language of the debate by replacing the popular term drone with one of a number of arguably more accurate—and less politically loaded—alternatives including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). Still, drone remains the default term and will be for the foreseeable future. In fact, the lure and power of the word drone provides insight into the true nature and intensity of the debate. Drones have come to us from foreign battlefields and migrated to the domestic policy environment. While drones may be simple and varied machines, the ones we know best bear names that suggest both danger and brutality, the Predator (MQ-1) and the Reaper (MQ-9). Drones embody the glory of American technological superiority and innovation (at least for now) and appear to many as an ideal tool for facing a difficult, distant, and elusive enemy. Yet, woven into their usefulness abroad is a sense that they are the first expressions of a new reality defined by multiple related technologies whose transformative capacities are as dangerous here as they have been proved to be abroad. Drones captivate us. Their sleekly disturbing look, an odd combination of the fragile and the deadly, produces both fascination and fear. The word drone highlights these qualities, depicting a machine that is solitary, potentially autonomous, ever present, and quietly menacing. The truth is that those who suggest that public debate needs to focus clearly on what drones really are and really do, are missing the point. Facts alone will not resolve the heated discussions. Rather the idea of drones and the resulting questions, complex and varied as they are, are enmeshed in powerful narratives of fear and mistrust as drones have become a central element of the contemporary American political imagination. The drone debate is not only about targeted killings abroad or potential invasions of privacy at home; it is about how this emerging technology has come to symbolize the disorder, threat, uncertainty, and fear of our rapidly changing world. The challenge we face as a society is not simply how to regulate drones (which is clearly necessary) but rather how to learn from the passions they inspire such that we connect serious policy debate on emerging technologies with a respect and acknowledgement for the very real fears of so many.

# 2NC

#### That genocidal violence creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

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(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

**The status quo disproves the effectiveness of procedural solutions focus – securitization results in a faith in experts centralizes political decision-making while excluding the public**

Rana, ’11 [Aziz Rana received his A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He also earned a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard, where his dissertation was awarded the university's Charles Sumner Prize. He was an Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale; “Who Decides on Security?”; 8/11/11; Cornell Law Library; <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/87/>]

Today politicians and legal scholars routinely invoke fears that the balance between liberty and security has swung drastically in the direction of government’s coercive powers. In the post-September 11 era, such worries are so commonplace that in the words of one commentator, “it has become part of the drinking water of this country that there has been a trade-off of liberty for security.” According to civil libertarians, centralizing executive power and removing the legal constraints that inhibit state violence (all in the name of heightened security) mean the steady erosion of both popular deliberation and the rule of law. For Jeremy Waldron, current practices, from coercive interrogation to terrorism surveillance and diminished detainee rights, provide government the ability not only to intimidate external enemies but also internal dissidents and legitimate political opponents. As he writes, “We have to worry that the very means given to the government to combat our enemies will be used by the government against its enemies.” Especially disconcerting for many commentators, executive judgments – due to fears of infiltration and security leaks – are often cloaked in secrecy. This lack of transparency undermines a core value of democratic decisionmaking: popular scrutiny of government action. As U.S. Circuit Judge Damon Keith famously declared in a case involving secret deportations by the executive branch, “Democracies die behind closed doors. . . . When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation.” In the view of no less an establishment figure than Neal Katyal, now the Principal Deputy Solicitor General, such security measures transform the current presidency into “the most dangerous branch,” one that “subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government.” ¶ Widespread concerns with the government’s security infrastructure are by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential) discretion and preventing likely abuses. What is remarkable about these reform efforts is that, every generation, critics articulate the same basic anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis. After the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the branches and explicit constraints on government action. More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an “emergency constitution” premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices. As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty years ago, in his seminal book The Imperial Presidency (1973), that the courts “had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities” by abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political branches. Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can “generate[]—even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent—an apt language for potent criticism.” ¶ The hope – returned to by constitutional scholars for decades – has been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result has primarily been to entrench further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books to the post September 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role of junior partner – buttressing executive practices by providing its own constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation of politics. As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive times without any meaningful curtailments. Such realities underscore the dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today’s scholarship finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures. ¶ What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal government’s security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian solutions to curb this expansion? In this article I argue that the current reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very meaning of security has not remained static but rather has changed dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about popular knowledge – its strengths and limitations – have played a key role in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history, this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly literature. ¶ As an initial effort to delineate the relationship between knowledge and security, I will argue that throughout most of the American experience, the dominant ideological perspective saw security as grounded in protecting citizens from threats to their property and physical well-being (especially those threats posed by external warfare and domestic insurrection). Drawing from a philosophical tradition extending back to John Locke, politicians and thinkers – ranging from Alexander Hamilton and James Madison at the founding to Abraham Lincoln and Roger Taney – maintained that most citizens understood the forms of danger that imperiled their physical safety. The average individual knew that securing collective life was in his or her own interest, and also knew the institutional arrangements and practices that would fulfill this paramount interest. A widespread knowledge of security needs was presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating that citizens had the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect property or to respond to forms of external violence. Thus the question of who decides was answered decisively in favor of the general public and those institutions – especially majoritarian legislatures and juries – most closely bound to the public’s wishes. ¶ What marks the present moment as distinct is an increasing repudiation of these assumptions about shared and general social knowledge. Today the dominant approach to security presumes that conditions of modern complexity (marked by heightened bureaucracy, institutional specialization, global interdependence, and technological development) mean that while protection from external danger remains a paramount interest of ordinary citizens, these citizens rarely possess the capacity to pursue such objectives adequately. Rather than viewing security as a matter open to popular understanding and collective assessment, in ways both small and large the prevailing concept sees threat as sociologically complex and as requiring elite modes of expertise. Insulated decision-makers in the executive branch, armed with the specialized skills of the professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting information about safety and self-defense. The result is that the other branches – let alone the public writ large – face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for transparency or seek to challenge presidential discretion. Not surprisingly, the tendency of procedural reform efforts has been to place greater decision-making power in the other branches and then to watch those branches delegate such power back to the very same executive bodies.

#### Combinations of the alternative and the state result in the cooption of intellectuals into a political, interventionist sphere

**BISWAS 07** (Shampa, Prof – Politics, Whitman, 2007 "Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist" Millennium 36 (1)

While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, **there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process**. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward **Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces**, ‘the one public space **available to real alternative intellectual practices**: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. **The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’** and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, **and** most worrisome of all**, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.**17 **Said mentions** in this context **the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War**18, an area in which **there was considerable traffic of political scientists** (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) **with institutions of policy-making.** Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied **US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’**.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. **It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom.** Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

**3. This proves a fundamental inconsistency between the aff the justifications behind the aff – state attempts to seek security impose limits on the publics liberty**

Neocleous 08. Mark Neocleous is a Professor of the critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, UK and a member of the Editorial Collective of “Radical Philosophy”. Critique of Security. 11-12

So if these are bad days for equality, then they are also bad days for liberty. For any claim to liberty in contemporary world quickly runs up against the (counter-) demand for security. Much of the discussion concerning the theory and practices surrounding security centers on the relationship between these and their consequences for liberty. Either explicitly or implicitly, the assumption is that we must forego a certain amount of liberty in our desire for security. The general claim is that in seeking security, states need to constantly limit the liberties of citizens, and that the democratic society is One which has always aimed to strike the right 'balance' between liberty and security. The follow-on from this is that recent changes in international order, not least the attacks on the World Trade Center but also a more general sense or feeling of political instability, require us to rethink the balance much more towards security and thus away from liberty. Contemporary newspapers and periodicals are Saturated with articles on the 'balance' between liberty and security, governments have latched on to this ideological trope when presenting proposals for new security measures,' and it constitutes one of the animating ideas in judicial discussion. In this chapter I want to first unpick some of the underlying tensions in this Set of assumptions. More explicitly; I want to suggest that the key assumption involved- that liberty and security are antonyms and that we must somehow find a 'balance' between them - is desperately misplaced. The obvious tactic to achieve this might appear to be to focus On a range of key areas recent ‘terrorism’ 'legislation, the political implications of the perpetual ‘war on terror' and the ideological interpellation of all sorts of activities as 'terrorist', questions around 10 cards, new forms of surveillance technology and so on. But not only is this now rather well-trodden ground, but also virtually all the commentaries on these issues accept to some degree the need to find a ‘balance’

#### Studies prove that the more specific forecasts are the less probable they are – causes flawed threat evaluation that results in serial policy failure

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**The conjunction fallacy** similarly **applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities.** (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight *from* Thailand *to* the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. **According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story *must* render the story less probable.** It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. **Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that *adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.* People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare *by China,* than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack *from any source.* The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful *because* it is more vague.** More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. **Security expert Bruce Schneier observed** (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) **that the U.S. government was guarding *specific* domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to *any* disaster.** (Schneier 2005.)

#### No methodological basis for accurate political predictions – their scholarship is co-opted by governmental institutions and obscures the root causes of the case harms - overwhelming empirical evidence votes negative

Stevens 12 (Jacqueline, Prof of Polisci at Northwestern U, "Political Scientists Are Lousy Forecasters," www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/political-scientists-are-lousy-forecasters.html?\_r=1&pagewanted=all)

DESPERATE “Action Alerts” land in my in-box. They’re from the [American Political Science Association](http://www.apsanet.org/) and colleagues, many of whom fear grave “threats” to our discipline. As a defense, they’ve supplied “talking points” we can use to tell Congressional representatives that political science is a “critical part of our national science agenda.” Political scientists are defensive these days because in May the House passed an amendment to a bill eliminating National Science Foundation grants for political scientists. Soon the Senate may vote on similar legislation. Colleagues, especially those who have received N.S.F. grants, will loathe me for saying this, but just this once I’m sympathetic with the anti-intellectual Republicans behind this amendment. Why? The bill incited a national conversation about a subject that has troubled me for decades: the government — **disproportionately —** supports research that is amenable to statistical analyses and models even though everyone knows the clean equations mask messy realities that contrived data sets and assumptions don’t, and **can’t, capture**. It’s an open secret in my discipline: **in terms of accurate political predictions** (the field’s benchmark for what counts as science), my colleagues have **failed spectacularly** and **wasted colossal amounts of time and money**. The most obvious example may be political scientists’ insistence, during the cold war, that the Soviet Union would persist as a nuclear threat to the United States. In 1993, in the journal International Security, for example, the cold war historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote that the demise of the Soviet Union was “of such importance that no approach to the study of international relations claiming both foresight and competence should have failed to see it coming.” And yet, he noted, “None actually did so.” Careers were made, prizes awarded and millions of research dollars distributed to international relations experts, even though Nancy Reagan’s astrologer may have had superior forecasting skills. Political prognosticators fare just as poorly on domestic politics. In a peer-reviewed journal, the political scientist [Morris P. Fiorina](http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/morris-fiorina) wrote that “we seem to have settled into a persistent pattern of divided government” — of Republican presidents and Democratic Congresses. Professor Fiorina’s ideas, which synced nicely with the conventional wisdom at the time, appeared in an article in 1992 — just before the Democrat Bill Clinton’s presidential victory and the Republican 1994 takeover of the House. Alas, little has changed. Did any prominent N.S.F.-financed researchers predict that an organization like Al Qaeda would change global and domestic politics for at least a generation? Nope. Or that the Arab Spring would overthrow leaders in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia? No, again. What about proposals for research into questions that might favor Democratic politics and that political scientists seeking N.S.F. financing do not ask — perhaps, one colleague suggests, because N.S.F. program officers discourage them? Why are my colleagues kowtowing to Congress for research money that comes with **ideological strings** attached? The political scientist Ted Hopf wrote in a 1993 article that experts failed to anticipate the Soviet Union’s collapse largely because the military establishment played such a big role in setting the government’s financing priorities. “Directed by this logic of the cold war, research dollars flowed from private foundations, government agencies and military individual bureaucracies.” Now, nearly 20 years later, the A.P.S.A. Web site trumpets my colleagues’ collaboration with the government, “most notably in the area of defense,” as a reason to retain political science N.S.F. financing. Many of today’s peer-reviewed studies offer trivial confirmations of the obvious and policy documents filled with **egregious, dangerous errors**. My colleagues now point to research by the political scientists and N.S.F. grant recipients James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin that claims that civil wars result from weak states, and are not caused by ethnic grievances. Numerous scholars have, however, convincingly criticized Professors Fearon and Laitin’s work. In 2011 Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch wrote in the [American Political Science Review](http://www.apsanet.org/apsr/) that “rejecting ‘messy’ factors, like grievances and inequalities,” which are hard to quantify, “may lead to more elegant models that can be more easily tested, but the fact remains that some of the most **intractable and damaging conflict** processes in the contemporary world, including Sudan and the former Yugoslavia, are largely about **political and economic injustice**,” an observation that policy makers could glean from a subscription to this newspaper and that nonetheless is more astute than the insights offered by Professors Fearon and Laitin. How do we know that these examples aren’t **atypical cherries** picked by a political theorist munching sour grapes? Because in the 1980s, the political psychologist Philip E. Tetlock began systematically quizzing 284 political experts — most of whom were political science Ph.D.’s — on dozens of basic questions, like whether a country would go to war, leave NATO or change its boundaries or a political leader would remain in office. His book “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” won the A.P.S.A.’s prize for the best book published on government, politics or international affairs. Professor Tetlock’s main finding? Chimps randomly throwing darts at the possible outcomes would have done almost as well as the experts. These results wouldn’t surprise the guru of the scientific method, Karl Popper, whose 1934 book “The Logic of Scientific Discovery” remains the cornerstone of the scientific method. Yet Mr. Popper himself scoffed at the pretensions of the social sciences: “Long-term prophecies can be derived from scientific conditional predictions only if they apply to systems which can be described as well-isolated, stationary, and recurrent. These systems are very rare in nature; and **modern society is not one of them**.”

# 1NR

### AT Realism

They don’t access this – the aff is not realist because they utilize a liberal solution through legal institutions – that was cx – their advantages may be realist but their solvency mechanism is not, means they cannot access their advantages because a liberal solu

#### Their realism defenses are epistemologically bankrupt – they naturalize political assumptions to legitimize violence and oppressive political structures – Their method causes self-fulfilling prophesies – the alt is key to reclaim agency from inevitable violence

Busser 6 (Mark Busser, Masters Candidate at the Dept of Political Science at York University. Aug 2006, “The Evolution of Security: Revisiting the Human Nature Debate in International Relations ”, <http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/documents/WP40-Busser.pdf>)

**Responding directly to Thayer,** Duncan Bell and Paul MacDonald have expressed concern at the intellectual functionalism inherent in sociobiological explanations, suggesting that too often analysts choose a specific behaviour and **read backwards** into evolutionary epochs in an attempt to **rationalize explanations for that behaviour.** These arguments, Bell and MacDonald write, often fall into what Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould have called ‘adaptionism,’ or “the attempt to understand all physiological and behavioural traits of an organism as evolutionary adaptations.”42 Arguments such as these are **hand-crafted** by their makers, and tend to **carry forward their assumptions and biases**. In an insightful article, Jason Edwards suggests that sociobiology and its successor, evolutionary psychology, are fundamentally political because they frame their major questions in terms of an assumed individualism**.** Edwards suggests that the main question in both subfields is: “given human nature, how is politics possible?”43 The problem is that the ‘**givens’ of human nature are drawn backward from common knowledges and truths about humans in society, and the game-theory experiments** which seek to prove them are often **created with such assumptions in mind.** These arguments are seen by their critics as **politicized from the** very **start**. Sociobiology in particular has been widely interpreted as a **conservative politico-scientific tool** because of these basic assumptions, and because of the political writings of many sociobiologists.44 Because sociobiology **naturalizes certain behaviours** like **conflict, inequality and prejudice**, Lewontin et al. suggest that it “**sets the stage for legitimation of things as they are**.”45 The danger inherent in arguments that incorporate sociobiological arguments into examinations of modern political life, the authors say, is that such arguments naturalize variable behaviours and support discriminatory political structures. Even if certain behaviours are found to have a biological drives behind them, dismissing those behaviours as ‘natural’ **precludes the possibility** that human actors can make choices and can avoid anti-social, violent, or undesirable action.46 While the attempt to discover a geneticallydetermined human nature has usually been justified under the argument that knowing humankind’s basic genetic programming will help to solve the resulting social problems, discourse about human nature seems to generate self-fulfilling prophesies ////by putting limits on what is considered politically possible. While sociobiologists tend to distance themselves from the naturalistic fallacy that ‘what is’ is ‘what should be,’ there is still a problem with employing adaptionism to ‘explain’ how existing political structures because conclusions tend to be drawn in terms of conclusions that assert what ‘must be’ because of biologically ingrained constraints.47 Too firm a focus on sociobiological arguments about ‘natural laws’ **draws attention away** from humanity’s potential for social and political solutions that can **counteract and** **mediate** any inherent biological impulses, whatever they may be. A revived classical realism based on biological arguments **casts biology as destiny** in a manner that parallels the neo-realist sentiment that the international sphere is doomed to everlasting anarchy. Jim George quotes the English School scholar Martin Wight as writing that “hope is not a political virtue: it is a theological virtue.”48 George questions the practical result of traditional realsist claims, arguing that the suggestion that fallen man’s sinful state can only be redeemed by a higher power puts limitations on what is considered politically possible. Thayer’s argument rejects the religious version of the fallen man for a scientific version, but similar problems remain with his ‘scientific’ conclusions.

### AT Discourse

#### Not a discourse K – This is about the 1ACs knowledge production not about the effects that discourse have on participants in the debate round– the way they choose to assemble and frame the 1AC compromises the political action of the plan –– that’s Scrase and Ockwell

#### Rhetoric matters – it constrains our perception of problems and solutions

**Doremus 0** (Holly Doremus is Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and co-faculty director of the California Center for Environmental Law and Policy "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection:Toward a New Discourse" 1-1-2000scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=wlulr)

**Rhetoric matters**. That is almost too basic to be worth saying, but it bears repeating because sometimes the rhetoric we use to describe problems becomes so **ingrained** as to be almost **invisible**. Even if we are unaware of it, though, rhetoric has the **very real effect** of severely **constraining our perception of a problem** and its potential solutions. Terminology is one aspect of rhetoric. The words we use to describe the world around us **condition our response** to that world. Whether we use the word "swamps" or "wetlands," for example, may determine whether we drain or protect those areas.1 Not surprisingly, the battle to control terminology is an important one in the environmental context.2 But there is far more to the rhetoric of law. The way words are put together to form stories and discourses **shapes** the law and society. Stories, which put a human face on concerns that might otherwise go unnoticed, exert a powerful emotional tug.3 "Discourses," loose collections of concepts and ideas, provide a **shared language** for envisioning problems and solutions.4

### Epist

On flow

### China

#### No Asian war- economic and regional cooperation

**Bitzinger & Desker 8** – senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328\_731200556\_906256449.pdf)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

#### More warrants-

#### Interdependence and democracy

Vannarith 10—Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. PhD in Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific U (Chheang, Asia Pacific Security Issues: Challenges and Adaptive Mechanism, http://www.cicp.org.kh/download/CICP%20Policy%20brief/CICP%20Policy%20brief%20No%203.pdf)

Large scale interstate war or armed conflict is unthinkable in the region due to the high level of interdependency and democratization. It is believed that economic interdependency can reduce conflicts and prevent war. Democracy can lead to more transparency, accountability, and participation that can reduce collective fears and create more confidence and trust among the people in the region. In addition, globalism and regionalism are taking the center stage of national and foreign policy of many governments in the region except North Korea. The combination of those elements of peace is necessary for peace and stability in the region and those elements are present and being improved in this region.

#### Resilient regional cooperation

Alagappa 8 (Muthia, Distinguished Fellow @ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy @ Tufts, “The Long Shadow,” International Affairs p. 512)

International political interaction among Asian states is for the most part rule governed, predictable, and stable. The security order that has developed in Asia is largely of the instrumental type, with certain normative contractual features (Alagappa 2003b). It rests on several pillars. These include the consolidation of Asian countries as modern nation-states with rule-governed interactions, wide- spread acceptance of the territorial and political status quo (with the exception of certain boundary disputes and a few survival concerns that still linger), a regional normative structure that ensures survival of even weak states and supports inter- national coordination and cooperation, the high priority in Asian countries given to economic growth and development, the pursuit of that goal through partici- pation in regional and global capitalist economies, the declining salience of force in Asian international politics, the largely status quo orientation of Asia's major powers, and the key role of the United States and of regional institutions in pre- serving and enhancing security and stability in Asia.

### Terror Reps

Bioterrorism draws divisions between the civilized US and the uncivilized outside world

Loeppke, ’05 [2005, Rodney, Prof. Int’l Relations and Politics @ U of Sussex, “Bioterrorizing US Policies,” Millennium, Vol 34, Issue 1]

More specifically in relation to bioterror, there has been an amplification of threat perception, which has revised the technological and civilisational discourse that once offered reassurance. Prior to 9/11, government agencies exercised some reserve in characterizing the viability and severity of threat based on biological weapons. For instance, a prominent and influential report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) was taken seriously by lawmakers, when it stated that, …in most cases terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release chemical or biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a state sponsor…. [S]pecialized knowledge is required in the manufacturing process and in improvising an effective delivery device for most chemical and nearly all biological agents that could be used in terrorist attacks. Moreover, some of the required components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of biological agents are difficult to obtain.7 This is not to suggest a pre-9/11 absence of concern about the circulation, even possible use, of a biological weapon.8 However, a much greater urgency has recently been attached to biological weapons, fueled in large part by the terrorist imagery referred to above. Hardly limited to the conventional foreign policy establishment, even Tommy Thompson, then US Secretary of Health and Human Services, stated confidently that, “enemies seek, and in some cases have already obtained, the ability to acquire and manipulate biological, chemical and nuclear weapons that could penetrate our military defenses and civilian surveillance systems and cause significant harm.”9 The Bush Administration’s policies, in tandem with Congressional oversight, resound with invocations of open-ended biological threat possibilities, which not only point to the resourcefulness and cunning of America’s ‘enemies’, but also rely on the latter’s ‘irrational’ qualities. W.J. ‘Billy’ Tauzin, then Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, for instance, encapsulates this starkly dichotomous thinking around bioterrorism, stating that “[w]e don’t think like evil people in America. Evil people think different [sic] than we do—we have to force ourselves to think preemptively.”10 It is critical to note that the certitude with which the US foreign policy establishment speaks to the issue of bioterror emerges largely out of a subjunctive reality. In both intellectual and policymaking circles, there is almost a ritualistic citing of weak case evidence, followed by a thinly constructed assertion that mass casualty bioterror attacks are undeniably on the horizon. Substantiating this new reality usually includes reference to the attempts by the Rajneeshees in 1984 to infect local salad bars with Salmonella; Aum Shinrikyo’s unsuccessful work with biological pathogens; and the subsequent discovery of Anthrax in powder form in the Fall of 2001.11 These strangely transparent attempts to construct a coherent historical trajectory of bioterror fail to provide any particularly compelling evidence concerning the likelihood of future mass casualty scenarios. Even proponents of large-scale bioterrorism preparedness, such as Amy Smithson, insist that, “rubbing some type of an anthrax substance on a keyboard is not a mass casualty dispersal attempt,” and that, “Aum’s germ weapons program…was a flop from start to finish because the technical obstacles were so significant.”12 Indeed, a far more damning evaluation is provided by Milton Leitenberg, who not only takes apart the precedent-setting rendition of these events, but also states pointedly that a detailed examination by the RAND Corporation of 15 terrorist-labeled groups, “demonstrated virtually zero evidence of efforts to produce biological agents.”13 Such sobering counter-evidence, however, has little influence on the discursive muscle of consecutive ‘what if?’ statements, a practice recently exercised in a highly publicised Presidential Directive on biodefence, which builds its case around putative vulnerability: Biological weapons attacks could cause catastrophic harm. They could inflict widespread injury and result in massive casualties and economic disruption. Bioterror attacks could mimic naturally-occuring disease, potentially delaying recognition of an attack and creating uncertainty about whether one has ever occurred. An attacker may thus believe that he could escape identification and capture or retaliation. Biological weapons attacks could be mounted either inside or outside the United States and, because some biological weapons agents are contagious, the effects of an initial attack could spread widely.14 The cumulative effect of such constant invocations of impending danger is to equate the identification of any potential ‘vulnerability’ with the palpable existence of threat, and this has certainly constituted a staple of US foreign policy for some time. David Campbell has supplied some of the most compelling historically-oriented analysis of such discursive practices. In one of his central works, Writing Security, Campbell tracks the powerful discursive trends which guide US policy before, during and after the Cold War.15 Beyond this, he makes a persuasive case for the critical role of foreign policy in the constitution of the domestic political scene, as well as the wider domain of American identity. Campbell points out that a common thread of the foreign policy establishment, broadly understood, is its reproduction and renewal of ‘danger discourse’—a recurring invocation of externally emanating threats to the well being of American society. Here, [t]he global inscription of danger was something that long preceded the cold war, but it was in the cold war, when numerous overseas obligations were constructed, that the identity of the United States became even more deeply implicated in the external reach of the state…. [C]oncomitant with this external expansion was an internal magnification of the modes of existence which were to be interpreted as risks. Danger was being totalized in the external realm in conjunction with its increased individualization in the internal field, with the result being the reconstitution of the borders of the state’s identity.16 Campbell in no way tries to explain away Soviet practices as a mere discursive chimera. He states repeatedly that Soviet policies exhibited a range of troubling patterns, but it remains important to note their representation in foreign policy discourse in no way required adherence to historical reality. Instead, the ‘parade of horribles’ fundamentally associated to the Soviet Union’s existence provided the basis for both a highly militarised American society, as well as a powerful narrowing of the legitimate boundaries of political challenge within a liberal-democratic, market society. It is important to note that throughout the 1990s, Campbell’s is hardly the only attempt to reconceptualise the manner in which security politics can be understood. On the one hand, rather conventional understandings of security were expanded to incorporate new (objectively understood) ‘threats’, including those ostensibly emanating from the environment, migration, or religious fundamentalism.17 Much of this work carried with it a deeply conservative undertow, equating new issues-areas with immanent conflict or acute crisis, and advocating a defensive posture towards externally-derived ‘threats’. Campbell’s work, on the other hand, fits into a counteroffensive of discursively-grounded security approaches which openly challenged the basis upon which security had been conceptualised. Calling into account the reliability and constructed nature of ‘threats’, this literature placed in question the reification of the state and its capacity to effect security for those under its auspices.18 While largely ignored by conventional security theorists, such discursive approaches have had an undeniable effect on the so-called constructivist school.19 Best captured in the writings of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, constructivist security theorists take seriously the unstable nature of security and threats, but insist that, …even the socially constituted often gets sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one has to do analysis also on the basis that it continues, using one’s understanding of the social construction of security not only to criticize this, but also to understand the dynamics of security and thereby maneuvre them.20 We will return to this below in a more evaluative spirit. Here, it is only important to underline Campbell’s analysis within a wider trajectory of post-Cold War security studies that questioned the status of threat discourse. Campbell’s work merits special attention inasmuch as it interprets threats as constitutive of American identity, and it does so in a historically-conceived fashion that provides a deeper understanding of threat discourse as it emerged in the post-Cold War period. In the aftermath of post-1989 political realignments in Europe, Campbell’s argument offered a compelling suggestion that, “…the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse, reproducing the identity of ‘the United States’ and containing challenges to it is likely to require new discourses of danger.”21 In this sense, the newly refurbished threat of bioterror most certainly fits the bill, in that it offers an interconnected international and domestic terrain of open-ended threat possibilities. As so many intellectual and political practitioners want to suggest, the risks now associated to biological weapons are limited only by the psychosis of potential perpetrators—a truly dangerous world.22 There is, of course, much to contest here. Even if one were to leave aside the extensive role of state terror orchestrated around the world, not the least of which has been endorsed or organised by successive US administrations, it is difficult to reconcile the ostensible desire to protect citizens’ health from bioterror and the ongoing dilemma of public and personal health in the American//// context. As Leitenberg rightly points out, roughly 30,000 people die from influenza A and B each year; more than 750,000 cases of sepsis occur annually, of which 215,000 die; weight-related death kills 300,000 per year; and 440,000 yearly deaths are tobacco-related.23 Importantly, even those who are otherwise in support of so-called bioterror preparedness exhibit concern about its equation with public health. In fact, there is considerable apprehension that the substantial redirection of resources toward bioterror preparedness is coming at the expense of general public health and not enhancing any realistic response There is no necessity here for a full discussion of public and personal health challenges facing American society, but the gravity of such challenges certainly stands in direct confrontation with the marked certitude with which bioterrorist threats are now regularly invoked. capacities.24 This problematisation gives rise to an obvious question, one suggested by Buzan and Wæver’s work: what is the ‘referent object’ that needs to be protected in the emergent foreign and domestic policy continuum surrounding biological weapons and bioterror? The logic of Campbell’s argument would suggest it to be nothing less than the reproduction of the domestic identity that separates the United States from the ‘uncivilised’ world. As such, bioterror has been called up in conjunction with a range of other ‘new’ threats, in a manner that reasserts the necessity of both the United States’ international role and its constitutive identity as a bulwark of rational, democratic and peaceful Western values. While this reproductive logic of threat discourse affords considerable insight into the operationalisation of power in the American political context, it is, nonetheless, worth considering whether the particular (and emphatic) invocation of biological terror can be grounded in the specific interests of prevailing social relations. Here, grappling with the material (social) purpose of political ordering via foreign policy is, in my view, complementary to Campbell’s discursive approach. Michel Foucault, whose theoretical presence is heavy in Campbell’s work, insisted on a double conditioning, in which ‘disciplines’ and ‘biopower’ operate in tandem with, “the strategic envelope that makes them work.”25 And the ‘strategic envelope’ to which he consistently referred was both the state and capital. Indeed, for Foucault, the, “growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, ‘political anatomy,’ could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions.”26 None of this is to claim that Campbell’s (or Foucault’s) real interest lies in capitalist exploitation; rather it is to contend that his valuable understanding of how power is operationalised through discursive regimes does not eschew our responsibility to elucidate its ‘strategic envelope’ of state coercive and class dynamics. For observers of the current ‘biomania’ in foreign policy, this demands the explicit articulation and interpretation of state and capital relations that prop up this vague yet powerful threat discourse.

#### No extinction - history proves

Easterbrook ‘3 (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

#### Their evidence is exaggerated

Leitenberg ‘5 (Milton, Senior Research Scholar @ University of Maryland, “ASSESSING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BIOTERRORISM THREAT,” December 2005)

Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public perceptions and policy prescriptions. For the past decade the risk and immanence of the use of biological agents by nonstate actors/terrorist organizations—“bioterrorism”—has been systematically and deliberately exaggerated. It became more so after the combination of the 9/11 events and the October- November 2001 anthrax distribution in the United States that followed immediately afterwards. U.S. Government officials worked hard to spread their view to other countries. An edifice of institutes, programs, conferences, and publicists has grown up which continue the exaggeration and scare-mongering. In the last year or two, the drumbeat had picked up. It may however become moderated by the more realistic assessment of the likelihood of the onset of a natural flu pandemic, and the accompanying realization that the U.S. Government has been using the overwhelming proportion of its relevant resources to prepare for the wrong contingency.

### Trade

#### Zero risk of trade war- the concept isn’t real

Alden ‘12 (Edward, Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), specializing in U.S. economic competitiveness “What Exactly Is a “Trade War”? Time to Abolish a Silly Notion,” http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/10/23/what-exactly-is-a-trade-war-time-to-abolish-a-silly-notion/, October 23, 2012)

I have a suggestion for everyone who writes about international trade: it is time to bury, once and for all, the concept of a “trade war.” The phrase is so ubiquitous that it will be awfully hard to abolish; I have probably been guilty myself from time to time. Indeed, it is almost a reflex that every time the United States or some other nation takes any action that restricts imports in any fashion, reporters and editorial writers jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming. But it is a canard that makes it far harder to have a sensible discussion about U.S. trade policy. No sooner had President Obama and Mitt Romney finished their latest round of “who’s tougher on trade with China?” in their final debate Monday night than the New York Times – to take one of many possible examples – warned that “formally citing Beijing as a currency manipulator may backfire, economic and foreign-policy experts have said. In the worst case, it could set off a trade war, leading to falling American exports to China and more expensive Chinese imports.” But what exactly is a “trade war”? To take the U.S.-China example, the notion seems to be that, if the United States restricts Chinese imports, China will respond by restricting imports of U.S. goods, in turn leading to further U.S. restrictions and so on and so on until trade between the two countries plummets. The closest historical example is the reaction to the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930, which raised the average U.S. tariff on imports to historically high levels. As trade historian Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth has show persuasively, Smoot-Hawley did not cause the Great Depression, and probably did not even exacerbate it very much since trade was a tiny part of the U.S. economy. But Smoot-Hawley did result in Great Britain, Canada and other U.S. trading partners raising their own tariffs in response. Irwin suggests that the higher tariffs were probably responsible for about a third of the 40 percent drop in imports between 1929 and 1932, and perhaps a slightly higher percentage of export losses. And the new trade barriers put in place took many decades to dismantle. With imports and exports today comprising roughly a third of the U.S. economy, and the few remaining tariffs mostly in the single digits, the consequences of similar tit-for-tat tariff increases today would be far more severe. But what are the chances of such a “trade war” actually occurring? Pretty close to zero, for two big reasons. First, in 1930, there was no World Trade Organization, no North American Free Trade Agreement, no European Community/Union – in short, no rules to prevent countries from jacking up tariffs or imposing quotas whenever governments felt domestic political pressure to do so. Today, such unilateral action is largely forbidden. Indeed, the tit-for-tat measures we have seen in the U.S.-China trade relationship have all been taken within the framework of WTO rules. When the Obama administration curbed purchases of Chinese steel in 2009 under the “Buy America” provisions of the stimulus, for example, China responded with an “anti-dumping” case which led to tariffs on imports of U.S. steel. But the United States challenged that action in the WTO, and just last week the WTO ordered China to lift the duties. No trade war – instead the phrase “see you in court” comes to mind. Secondly, almost every nation in the world seems fully aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism. One of the striking things about the Great Recession– which resulted in global trade volumes plunging by more than 12 percent in 2009, the biggest drop since World War II – is how little of the protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred. Chad Bown of the World Bank has documented the surprising low level of new trade barriers imposed during the recession and its aftermath. The danger of competitive currency devaluations – which are not clearly covered under WTO rules – is a greater threat than tariffs. This is one of the reasons that Romney’s pledge to label China a currency manipulator could be playing with fire, particularly after more than seven years in which the value of the renminbi has been creeping up steadily against the dollar. And his suggestion that the United States would impose tariffs in response is just silly – it would be a blatant violation of WTO rules and would quickly be slapped down as such. Again, however, no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO decision with which a Romney administration would quickly comply.

### Econ AT Royal

#### Royal is wrong – No rally-around-the-flat effect- political suicide for leaders

Boehmer ‘2 (Charles Boehmer, Ph.D. in Political Science @ Penn. State University, Department of Political Science, Aassistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Texas at El Paso, “Domestic Crisis and Interstate Conflict: The Impact of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, <http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/boehmer.html>, March 24, 2002)

Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet, we know that militarized interstate conflicts are generally rare events, whereas lower rates of growth are not. A growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur following lower rates of economic growth and domestic discord? Moreover, do higher rates of growth lead to international peace and domestic stability? This paper examines how economic conditions jointly affect the probability of both militarized interstate conflict and regime transition. Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy and political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Mueller 1973; Blechman and Kaplan 1978). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case[1] but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.[2] The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was clearly reeling from rising inflation and unemployment associated with economic contraction and a foreign debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the then current Galtieri regime, although history shows us that Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime was removed from power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics befall a similar outcome? Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. While it is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict/////////////////////// and regime change. Again, lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do in fact undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power (especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy). Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit.